Nacre launches as a 3-of-4 validator quorum with a custodial signer, and ships in phases toward full trust minimization. Every phase preserves two protocol guarantees: 1:1 PRL backing and the user’s 7-day emergency exit. This is the public roadmap. Each phase is an admin-authorized upgrade with appropriate timelocks; the protocol structure (Cold Reserve, validator quorum, aggregator pre-flight) is preserved across phases.Documentation Index
Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.nacrelabs.xyz/llms.txt
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Phase 1: Launch · Custodial signer, validator quorum
Live at mainnet. The minimum viable bridge.- 1:1 PRL ↔ wPRL backing
- 3-of-4 P-256 validator quorum signs every mint and burn
- TEE-backed custody (Privy) translates the P-256 quorum into native Pearl secp256k1 and Solana ed25519 signatures
- 7-day user emergency exit on every Deposit Address
- 7-day admin-only Cold Reserve recovery (script-path leaf 0)
Phase 2: Self-custody · FROST removes the custodian
Target: post-launch upgrade. Validators stop relying on a third-party custodian. The 3-of-4 P-256 quorum is replaced by 3-of-4 FROST-secp256k1-tr threshold signing: validators hold their key shares directly and produce native Schnorr signatures collaboratively. What changes:- No more custodial layer. Pearl signatures are produced by FROST, Solana signatures by a parallel FROST-ed25519 (or hybrid) scheme.
- One Cold Reserve rotation. The Cold Reserve is migrated to a new Taproot internal key derived from the FROST aggregate.
- Aggregator role narrows. Becomes a FROST coordinator instead of a custody forwarder.
Phase 3: Hardware attestation · FROST shares inside enclaves
Target: after FROST is stable in production. Every validator’s FROST share lives inside a remotely-attested TEE (Nitro Enclave, SGX, or equivalent). The share is unusable outside an attested enclave, even by the validator operator. What changes:- Each validator publishes a reproducibly-built enclave image; its
PCR0measurement is registered on-chain. - Every signing artifact carries an attestation document.
- The Anchor program verifies the attestation root and
PCR0whitelist before accepting an attestation.
Phase 4: ZK validation · Cryptographic proofs replace signatures
Target: long-horizon, in research alongside earlier phases. Validator signatures become redundant alongside cryptographic proofs. Three sub-paths, deployable independently or together:- zk-Pearl light client on Solana. Continuous header-chain proof verifies Pearl finality directly on Solana.
- zk-SPV per deposit. Each deposit ships with a succinct proof of inclusion against the verified header chain.
- zk-FROST proof of correct validator behavior. Validators prove that their attestations were produced from finalized state per spec.
Phase 5: Sunset · Removing the admin
Target: when the protocol is provably trust-minimized. The admin multisig retires. Options under consideration:- Full ossification: disable program upgrades entirely; the protocol becomes immutable.
- On-chain governance: replace the admin with a tokenholder DAO.
- Sunset Cold Reserve leaf 0: remove the admin-only recovery path or replace it with a much broader multisig.
Migration ordering
Timelines
Specific dates and block-heights are not committed in advance. Every phase ships when it’s audited and stable in production. FollowTBD for milestones.